COMMENTS

Private School Voucher Remedies in
Education Cases
Greg D. Andrest
Forty-nine state constitutions guarantee the right to an
education.' Under these provisions, state legislatures have a
duty to provide students with a minimum level of education.
Several courts have ruled that their states' school systems have
failed to satisfy their constitutional standards, and have ordered
legislatures to improve conditions. Nonetheless, most legislatures
remain defiant, failing to ensure adequate educational programs.
Education litigation over adequate schooling has resulted in
prolonged struggles between the judicial and legislative branches
of state governments. Courts have largely left funding decisions
to state legislatures due to separation-of-powers concerns. Legislatures, however, have generally been unwilling or unable to
provide sufficient funding for local schools. Schools lack proper
finding for construction, educational programs, and teacher
training. Consequently, students continue to attend constitutionally inadequate public schools.
Frustrated by legislative inaction, student-plaintiffs in two
recent suits brought under state constitutional education provisions requested remedies in the form of vouchers, which would
allow the students to apply state funds to private school tuition.

t BAL. 1989, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate 1995, The University of
Chicago.
' Mississippi is the only state without an education clause. See William E. Thro, The
Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School FinanceLitigation, 79 Educ L
Rptr 19 (1993) (collecting state constitutional provisions).
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These cases, Jenkins v Leininger2 in Chicago and Arviso v
Dawson3 in Los Angeles, are currently awaiting review by state
appellate courts.4 They represent the next phase of education
litigation, the remedial stage, and will undoubtedly spark similar
litigation across the country.5
Under a voucher plan, a student could use the full amount,
but no more, of the per-pupil spending in the student's public
school district at a private school. If private school tuition exceeds the per-pupil funding allotment, then the student would be
required to pay the difference. However, if the public school perpupil spending exceeds the cost of the private school, the student
would only receive the private school's tuition.6
This Comment argues that private school vouchers provide
an effective remedy for violations of students' state education
rights under state constitutions. Section I examines the history of
education reform litigation, focusing specifically on the reluctance
of state courts to take concrete steps to ensure the protection of
education rights. Section II argues that tuition vouchers are
legally justified and describes the comparative advantages of a
voucher remedy. Finally, Section III addresses objections to

2

No 92 CH 05578, slip op ([1ll Cir Ct, Cook County, Mar 30, 1993). The trial court

dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, id at 4, and said that the
court was, in any case, without power to grant the relief requested, id at 14.
' No B 077772, slip op ([Call Ct App, 2d App Dist, 3d Div, Mar 23, 1995), affg grant
of demurrer, No BC 057321, slip op ([Cal] Super Ct, Los Angeles County, June 4, 1993).
The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers, calling the complaint "uncertain," No
BC 057321, slip op at 2, and indicating that the court could not grant the relief sought
without violating separation of powers and specific provisions of the California Constitution, id at 3-4. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. No B
077772, slip op.
" As of the time of printing, the appellate court in Chicago has not yet set a date for
oral argument in Jenkins; the petitioners in Arviso filed a petition for review in the
California Supreme Court on May 2, 1995, but no action has been taken.
" The notion of states experimenting to solve challenging social problems has been
cited as one of the advantages of a federal system of government. Dissenting in New State
Ice Co. v Liebmann, Justice Brandeis wrote, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
285 US 262, 311 (1932) [SEMICOLON IN QUOTE CORRECT]. Successful experiments inevitably spread to surrounding states and may potentially spread nationwide.
' This Comment does not address the Establishment Clause implications of using
state funds in religious schools. For discussion of the Establishment Clause issues involved in state subsidization of private religious schools, see Michael W. McConnell,
Multiculturalism,Majoritariansm,and EducationalChoice: What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U Chi Legal F 125, 139-49; Mark G. Yudof, David L.
Kirp, and Betsy Levin, EducationalPolicy and the Law 130-35 (West, 3d ed 1992); Note,
School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of PublicAid to PrivatePa.
rochial Schools, 81 Georgetown L J 711 (1993).
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judicially imposed vouchers, focusing on criticisms based on the
separation-of-powers and political-question doctrines.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION RIGHTS LITIGATION
Education reformers first challenged state-run education
systems in the federal courts under the United States Constitution in San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez.7
However, the Supreme Court refused to recognize education as a
federal constitutional right. Although this initial effort in the
federal courts failed to yield the desired result, it was influential
in shaping the strategies and outcomes of subsequent state-law
challenges.'
A. Success in State Courts
After Rodriguez, school reform litigants turned to the education clauses of state constitutions and sought redress in state

courts.9 Plaintiffs sought enforcement of provisions explicitly

mandating an "adequate"'0 or "efficient"" education. Several
courts, noting the difficulty in construing the legislative intent
behind education clauses, have opted for broad readings, thus
granting substantial education rights. Courts have generally
interpreted these provisions in a modern context, relying on the
notion that state constitutions were "ratified to function as [ I
organic document[s] to govern society and institutions as they
evolve through time." 2

' 411 US 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, a group of school children challenged the Texas
school finance system, claiming that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court concluded that the system did not discriminate against a
suspect class, id at 28, and that education was not a fundamental right or liberty protected by the United States Constitution, id at 35. Note, however, that the Court left open the
possibility of a constitutional challenge to a state school finance system that "occassioned
an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of [the state's] children." Id at 37.
8 See generally John J. Gibbous, Like its Lineage, Abbott Is a Product of the Times,
NJ L J 19 (June 21, 1990); Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School FinanceReform Litigation, 75 Va L Rev 1639, 1653-57
(1989).
' The expansion of education rights under state constitutions is consistent with the
trend toward guaranteeing rights not protected by the federal Constitution by reading
them into the individual state constitutions. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489 (1977).
"oSee, for example, Ga Const, Art VIII, § 1, 1 1; McDaniel v Thomas, 248 Ga 632,
285 SE2d 156 (1981).
" See, for example, Tex Const, Art VII, § 1; Edgewood Independent School District v
Kirby, 777 SW2d 391 (Tex 1989).
' Kirby, 777 SW2d at 394. See also Billy D. Walker, Intent of the Framers in the
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The New Jersey Supreme Court pioneered the use of a state
constitutional education clause to establish education rights. In
Robinson v Cahill ("Robinson 1), decided only thirteen days after
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, the
New Jersey Supreme Court read the state constitutional provision requiring "a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools" as establishing an individually enforceable positive right
to a thorough and efficient education." The court concluded that
the state education clause meant what it said: "[It] can have no
other import.... A system of instruction in any district which is
not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional command."'4 Although the court rejected the plaintiff's equal protection claims, it agreed with the trial court that the existing school
funding system was unconstitutional because it failed to provide
the level of education guaranteed by the state constitution.'
Education reformers throughout the United States, influenced by the recognition of education rights in the New Jersey
Constitution, focused their energies on state constitutions and
state courts. Robinson I generated suits in more than half of the
states. 6 In the 1970s and early 1980s, several of these suits
relied on equal protection guarantees in state constitutions, while
others relied directly on state education clauses. 7 Currently,
most suits focus on education clauses, 8 and a number of courts
have found state public school systems unconstitutional under
these provisions. 9 For example, the Montana Supreme Court

Education Provisionsof the Texas Constitution of 1876, 10 Rev Litig 625, 626-27 (1991).
13 62 NJ 473, 303 A2d 273, 292 (1973), quoting NJ Const, Art VIII, § IV,
1.
14 303 A2d at 294.
Id at 295.

16 Initially, Robinson I sparked suits in over fifteen states. See William E. Thro, The

Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of
Public School FinanceReform Litigation, 19 J L & Educ 219, 228-29 n 42 (1990). Later, a
new wave of suits began, with cases filed in over half the states. See William E. Thro,
JudicialAnalysis During the Third Wave of School FinanceLitigation:The Masiachusetts
Decision as a Model, 35 BC L Rev 597, 599 n 5 (1994).
13 See Thro, 19 J L & Educ at 219, 228-31.
See Thro, 79 Educ L Rptr at 19-23 (cited in note 1). One reason state courts have
been averse to granting education rights on equal protection grounds is the potentially
explosive effect of a successful suit on analogous claims for housing or other welfare
rights. See Thro, 19 J L & Educ at 241-42. See also Note, 75 Va L Rev at 1654 (cited in
note 8), quoting Robinson I, 303 A2d at 283 ("[Tihe equal protection clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply answers in the vast area of human needs.").
See, for example, Abbott v Burke, 136 NJ 444, 643 A2d 575 (1994) (relying on
"thorough and efficient" education clause); Rose v Council for Better Education, Inc., 790
SW2d 186 (Ky 1989) (relying on "efficient" education clause); Dupree v Alma School
District No. 30, 279 Ark 340, 651 SW2d 90 (1983) (relying on both equal protection and
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struck down the state's public school funding scheme using the
state constitution's education clause in Helena Elementary School
District No. 1 v State." There, the plaintiffs challenged the
1985-86 Montana school budget, alleging that the scheme created
vast disparities in per-pupil funding and deprived students of
their education rights.2 According to the court, the Montana
Constitution requires the state to provide "a system of education
which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person
of this state."' The court found that the existing funding system
failed to satisfy this mandateY Similarly, in Edgewood Independent School District v Kirby, the Texas Supreme Court struck

down the state's public school financing scheme as unconstitutional under the education clause of the Texas Constitution.'
Courts that have adjudicated cases under education clauses
have read justiciable standards into the constitutional text. In
Rose v Council for Better Education, Inc., for example, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that an "efficient" education, within
the meaning of the state constitution, would at a minimum equip
students with seven specific categories of knowledge or skills,
including written and oral skills, an understanding of governmental processes, and skills to prepare students to work productively.' The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Tennessee Small
"general, suitable, and efficient" education clauses); Seattle School DistrictNo. 1 v Washington, 90 Wash 2d 476, 585 P2d 71 (1978) (relying on "ample" education clause); Horton
v Meskill, 172 Conn 615, 376 A2d 359 (1977) (relying on both equal protection and education clauses).
2 236 Mont 44, 769 P2d 684 (1989), modified, 236 Mont 60, 784 P2d 412 (1990).
21 Because the Montana system, like the Texas system at issue in Rodriguez, relied
on property taxes, the variations in property values across the state resulted in disparate
funding levels for local schools. Some districts held an eight-to-one advantage over others
with regard to per-pupil spending. 769 P2d at 686-88.
' Id at 689, quoting Mont Const, Art X, § 1.
2
769 P2d at 690.
24 777 SW2d 391 (Tex 1989). The Texas Supreme Court held that the "state's school
financing system is neither financially efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a
'general diffusion of knowledge' statewide, and that therefore it violates article VTI,
section 1 of the Texas Constitution." Id at 397.
2
790 SW2d 186 (Ky 1989). The court held that:
[Aln efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every
child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or
her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each
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School Systems v McWherter, defined the parameters of its state's
education clause more generally, requiring a system of education
that affords students the opportunity to gain "general
knowledge," reasoning powers, and those skills necessary to prepare students for a "mature life."26
Rose, Tennessee Small School Systems, Helena Elementary
School District No. 1, and Kirby represent the current trend in
legal challenges to state education systems. By 1990, education
rights had been firmly established as affirmative guarantees
under state constitutions-enforceable rights grounded in justiciable standards. In most states, litigation now focuses on the
remedies that should be available when those rights have been
violated.
B. Rights without Remedies
Although many courts have recognized state education
rights, few have effectively enforced those rights. Consequently,
students continue to attend constitutionally deficient schools,"
and education litigation lingers on.
Several factors account for judicial restraint in education
cases.' First, courts are wary of separation-of-powers principles
and often interpret them to preclude judicial action in education,

student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient
training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields
so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently, and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the
job market.
Id at 212.
26 851 SW2d 139, 150-51 (1993). The Tennessee Supreme Court said that "the word
'education' [as used in the state constitution education clause,] has a definite meaning and
needs no modifiers in order to describe the precise duty imposed upon the legislature." Id
at 150. It requires "that the General Assembly shall maintain and support a system of
free public schools that provides, at least, the opportunity to acquire general knowledge,
develop the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally prepare students intellectually for a mature life." Id at 150-51.
27 Despite twenty years of reform litigation in New Jersey, The Record, a New Jersey
daily newspaper, reports that notwithstanding court rulings, legislative initiatives, and
massive spending increases, "it would be hard to find anyone who thinks New Jersey's
children are better schooled in 1993 than they were in 1970." John Kolesar, Schools at a
Breaking Point... The New Governor Will Face an Education-FundingMess in the State
That's Grown Even Bigger, Record 001 (Jan 2, 1994).
' See generally George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Court
Perspective on the State School FinanceDecisions, 35 BC L Rev 543, 545 (1994) (referring
to the courts' refusal to provide remedies in the state education cases as the "phenomenon
of merits boldness and remedial deference").
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traditionally considered a legislative function.' Second, education finance policy involves tax issues, and courts are hesitant to
infringe on the legislative taxation power."° Third, majoritarian
constraints have limited the role of popularly elected state
courts." Fear of voter backlash over increased taxes compounds
the problem by discouraging elected state judges from addressing
difficult education reform issues.
The history of education reform litigation in New Jersey
illustrates the difficulties in enforcing education rights in the face
of judicial deference and legislative inaction. In 1973, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held in Robinson I that the state's school
finance system was constitutionally inadequate, 2 but left to the
legislature the task of providing a remedy.' Despite numerous
judicial deadlines, threats, sanctions, and orders, the New Jersey
legislature has still not passed legislation sufficient to ensure
students' education rights under the state constitution." As a
result, Kenneth Robinson, the named plaintiff who filed suit
when he was nine years old, has reached his thirties, and neither
the New Jersey Supreme Court nor the state legislature has yet
resolved the problems in the New Jersey educational system. As
of July 1994, plaintiffs were still litigating claims similar to those
supposedly resolved in Robinson. In Abbott v Burke ("Abbott III),
the New Jersey Supreme Court once again held the state's school
finance system unconstitutional, as applied to twenty-eight lowincome school districts. 5 Not surprisingly, however, while the
court used strong rhetoric to describe the deficiencies in the current school program, it shied away from any bold remedial orders.36 The court set deadlines for the legislature to correct the
See, for example, Danson v Casey, 484 Pa 415, 399 A2d 360 (1979) (holding that
the legislature was simply in a better position to handle education issues). See also Note,
Education Finance Reform Litigation and Separation of Powers: Kentucky Makes Its
Contribution, 80 Ky L J 309, 315 (1991-92). See also Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School
FinanceRemedies and State Courts, 104 Harv L Rev 1072, 1082-83 (1991).
' See, for example, Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v
Nyquist, 57 NY2d 27, 439 NE2d 359 (1982). See also Note, 104 Harv L Rev at 1083.
3'See Note, 104 Harv L Rev at 1083-84.
"2 See text accompanying notes 13-15.
303 A2d at 298.

See generally Kolesar, Record at 001 (cited in note 27).
136 NJ 444, 643 A2d 575 (1994). The court held New Jersey's school finance
legislation to be unconstitutional "based on [its] failure to assure parity of regular education expenditures between the special needs districts and the more affluent districts." Id
at 576.
' In Abbott III, the court cited several supplemental programs, such as preschool
programs, health services, and comprehensive guidance and school counseling, which
could improve education conditions in the "special needs" school districts. Id at 579.
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disparities. The state currently has until the 1997-98 school year
to remedy the problems. 7
The delays and inaction experienced in New Jersey typify
state constitutional challenges to deficient school systems. From
Massachusetts to California, courts and legislatures have after
decades of struggle still failed to provide adequate remedies for
violations of education rights."8 Despite judicial decisions, public
schools across the country fail to deliver the educational quality
state constitutions guarantee.
C. The Current Challenges: Jenkins v Leininger and Arviso v
Dawson
Unwilling to endure such delays, plaintiffs have recently
requested private school vouchers as a remedy for violations of
state constitutional education rights. Recently, plaintiffs in two
cases, Jenkins v Leiningerm in Chicago and Arviso v Dawson'
in Los Angeles, have requested vouchers.4

However, the court did not mandate implementation of any of these programs, deferring
to the legislature and the New Jersey Department of Education. Although the court
emphasized that the future of the state and all its citizens would be affected by the
quality of education, id at 581, it "decline[d] to enter any orders now," id at 576.
37 See id at 577.
' Similar problems have arisen in Massachusetts, Texas, and California, where the
education reform process has lingered on for many years after courts initially recognized
the deprivation of the student-plaintiffs' constitutional rights to education. In Texas, for
example, school finance reform litigation has spanned a twenty-five year period from the
1968 filing of Rodriguez to the 1989 determination that the school finance system violated
the state constitution in Kirby. The problems persisted after the Kirby decision as the
Texas Supreme Court and state legislature continued to battle over the appropriate
remedial action. The Texas Supreme Court has three times invalidated legislative plans
to finance the state's schools. On the second occasion, the court set a June 1, 1993, deadline for legislative action. The Texas legislature met this deadline; however, the legislation passed was challenged by the Kirby plaintiffs. In December 1993, a district judge in
Texas upheld the legislation as a temporary remedy but mandated that the state further
equalize funding by September 1, 1995. See Gardner Selby, School FundingDeadlineMay
Move Up, Houston Post A12 (Jan 11, 1994); Comment, Efficient and Suitable Provisionfor
the Texas Public School Finance System: An Impossible Dream?, 46 SMU L Rev 763
(1992).
' No 92 CH 05578, slip op at 2.
40 No B 077772, slip op. The opinion in this case names William Dawson, the Acting
Superintendent of Public Instruction on June 4, 1993, as defendant, while the complaint
and briefs name Bill Honig, the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
41 In a third case, Rivarde v Missouri, 930 F2d 641 (8th Cir 1991), black students
sought vouchers to transfer from segregated schools in Kansas City. The Eighth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs could not bring a new action based on a desegregation order in
another pending case and mandated that they instead intervene in the pending suit. See
Casenote, Jenkins v. Missouri: School Choice as a Method for Desegregatingan Inner-City
School District,81 Cal L Rev 1029 (1993).
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In both Jenkins and Arviso, the plaintiffs4 2 sought vouchers
to remedy violations of their education rights under their respective state constitutions.' They argued that their local public
schools did not provide them with adequate educational opportunities." In both school districts, crime in the schools was petvasive, dropout rates were significantly higher than the state average, and test scores were dismal.45 Accordingly, parents wished
to transfer their children to neighborhood private schools, where
better educational opportunities existed, and they requested
vouchers for tuition costs.46
Both suits were unsuccessful at the trial court level and are
currently being appealed. In 1993, the Cook County Circuit Court
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in Jenkins for failure to state a
cause of action, 47 adding in dicta that even if the plaintiffs had
established that Chicago's public schools were constitutionally
inadequate, policy considerations precluded the court from granting private school vouchers as a remedy. The court declared that
the plaintiffs' voucher request presented "essentially a political
question that should be decided in the public arena. Courts must
exercise judicial restraint. Courts should not attempt to decide
questions that rightfully belong to the legislature."'
The same year, the Los Angeles Superior Court denied relief
in Arviso, calling the plaintiffs' claim "uncertain."49 The court

The plaintiffs in Jenkins are one hundred low-income parents and children in the
Chicago school system. See Jenkins, No 92 CH 05578, slip op at 2. In Arviso, plaintiffs are

forty-seven low-income parents and children in the Los Angeles public school system. See
Appellants' Brief at 2, Arviso, No B 077772 (on file with U Chi L Rev).
4' The Illinois Constitution guarantees "an efficient system of high quality public
educational institutions and services." Ill Const, Art X, § 1.
The California Constitution provides that "the Legislature shall encourage by all
suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." Cal Const, Art D, § 1.
In Jenkins, the plaintiffs' complaint cited the following statistical data as evidence
of the schools' poor conditions: 70 percent of Chicago school students score below the na-

tional norm on standardized basic skills tests; graduation rates are below 50 percent,
significantly lower than the state average; and prospects for college are considered low.
Complaint at 12-14, Jenkins, No 92 CH 05578 (on file with U Chi L Rev). In Arviso, the
plaintiffs asserted that the schools they attend rank at or near the bottom by all measures: test scores are low, as are graduation rates. See Amended Complaint at 24-29, 3637, Arviso, No BC 057321 (on file with U Chi L Rev).
's Appellants' Brief at 4-6, Arviso, No B 077772; Appellants' Brief at 6-7, Jenkins, No
92 CH 05578 (on file with U Chi L Rev).
' See Appellants' Brief at 7-8, Arviso, No B 077772; Jenkins, No 92 CH 05578, slip
op at 2.
47 See Jenkins, No 92 CH 05578, slip op at 4.

48 Id at 14.

41 See Arviso, No BC 057321, slip op at 2.
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also reasoned that the allocation of school funds and, more generally, the fiscal decisions of the state were legislative tasks. Consequently, the court rejected the request for a voucher remedy,
concluding that it was prevented from ordering this relief by the
separation-of-powers and political-question doctrines, and the
California Court of Appeals affirmed."
II. VOUCHERS AS EQUITABLE REMEDIES

Students deprived of their state constitutional right to a
quality education have a right to a remedy. This Section sets
forth the reasons why courts should mandate the issuance of
vouchers as a remedy for a constitutionally inadequate education.
A. The Right to a Remedy
Both common law principles and state constitutional law
mandate enforcement of education rights. Most state constitutions contain remedy guarantee clauses that require states to
redress constitutional violations. 51 State courts are obligated to
protect constitutional rights, including education rights, and
remedy guarantee clauses require the courts to act. Furthermore,
armed with equitable powers, courts maintain the power to fashion novel and creative remedies for violations of these rights.
Thus, both remedy guarantee clauses and equitable powers enable courts to fashion adequate remedies.
First, a majority of state constitutions contain remedy guarantee clauses that, when applied to violations of constitutional
education rights, give state courts ample authority to fashion
remedies.52 For example, the Illinois Constitution states:
Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy,
property, or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely and promptly."

Id at 3, affd, No B 077772, slip op. The trial court also stated that relief in the
form of vouchers would violate the California Constitution. No BC 057321, slip op at 3-4.
"1 For a discussion of courts' remedial obligations, see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and
Resistance, 92 Yale L J 585 (1983).
5
At least thirty-eight state constitutions have remedy guarantee clauses. See David
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temple L Rev 1197, 1201 n 25 (1992) (collecting
state constitutional provisions).
SIll Const, Art I, § 12.
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These provisions codify the common law maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium-where there is a right, there is a remedy.'
While these provisions have generally been applied to tort
and contract actions, they reach all constitutional and statutory
rights.5 State constitutional education clauses create positive
rights to a quality education, and the remedy guarantee clauses
impose on courts a duty to redress violations of these rights.56 If
vouchers are an appropriate remedy for educational inadequacies,
then these remedy guarantee clauses authorize courts to grant
such a remedy.
Second, state courts possess the power in equity to fashion
and issue private school vouchers. Most state courts of general
jurisdiction, like their federal counterparts, are empowered to sit
in equity by constitutional grants.57 Their equitable powers are

' See Black's Law Dictionary 1520 (West, 6th ed 1990). See also R.L. v Bedell, 1994
W Va LEXIS 219 (extending remedy guarantee clause to citizen's right to seek grand jury
indictment); Neher v Chartier,319 Or 417, 879 P2d 156 (1994) (holding that law immunizing public bodies and officials from liability for tort or wrongful death suits for those
covered by worker's compensation violated the Oregon Constitution's remedy guarantee
clause).
' See Note, The Right ofAccess to Civil Courts under State ConstitutionalLaw: An
Impediment to Modern Reforms, or a Receptacle of Important Substantive and Procedural
Rights?, 13 Rutgers L J 399, 425 (1982) ("Constitutional provisions guaranteeing access to
state civil courts should not be dismissed as historical relics that serve more as impediments to change than as vibrant statements of cherished rights important in many
different contexts."); Burgess v Eli Lilly and Co., 66 Ohio St 3d 59, 609 NE2d 140 (1993)
(holding statute of limitations on right to recovery violates right-to-remedy clause of state
constitution).
' See Robinson v Cahill, 69 NJ 133, 351 A2d 713, 720 (1975) ("Robinson IV") (holding that if the right to education is a fundamental constitutional right, the court is obliged
to remedy violations of that right). See also Seattle School District No. 1 of King County v
Washington, 90 Wash 2d 476, 585 P2d 71, 87 (1978) ("Once it has been determined that
the court has the power or the duty to construe or interpret words or phrases in the
constitution and to give them meaning and effect by construction, it becomes a judicial
issue rather than a matter to be left to legislative discretion.").
"' The states began to merge law and equity in their judicial systems as early as
1848, beginning with the adoption of the Field Code in New York. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure adopted the merger in 1938. See Dan B. Dobbs, 1 Law of Remedies § 2.6
at 148 (West, 2d ed 1993); FRCP 1, 2.
Four states still have separate courts for law and equity: Arkansas, Delaware,
Mississippi, and Tennessee. Ark Stat Ann §§ 16-57-101 to 103 (1987); Del Const, Art IV,
§1; 10 Del Code Ann §§ 341-42, 541 (1975); Miss Const, Art 6, §§ 156, 157, 159; Miss Code
Ann §§ 9-5-81, 9-7-81 (1972); Tenn Code Ann §§ 16-10-101, 16-11-101 (1980).
State constitutions generally grant state courts the power to sit in equity. See, for
example, K N Energy, Inc. v City of Scottsbluff, 233 Neb 644, 447 NW2d 227 (1989);
Nethercutt v Pulaski County Special School District, 248 Ark 143, 450 SW2d 777 (1970).
The New Jersey Constitution provides a useful model of this jurisdictional grant to state
courts.
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broad and flexible, constrained only by judicial discretion, pragmatism, public policy, and the law.58 The use of vouchers that
this Comment proposes would function as an equitable remedy
devised to guarantee an affirmative right where there is no adequate legal remedy.
Equity seeks to provide relief that is necessary but unavailable in legal remedies. A court's equitable powers are invoked
when a plaintiff can show that no adequate legal remedy is available. To qualify as a legal remedy, the relief must be "clear, complete and as practical and efficient" as the equitable remedy.59
This is a difficult standard to meet and rarely precludes equitable
remedies." Equity power enables courts to fashion individual
and unique remedies to challenging problems6 ' such as those

Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the Chancery Division shall exercise the powers and functions of the other division when the ends of
justice so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that
all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined.
NJ Const, Art VI, § M, 4.
' See Michigan Salt Works v Baird, 173 Mich 655, 139 NW 1030, 1032 (1913) ("exercise of [equitable powers] jurisdiction rests in the sound discretion of the court"); Hall v
Wood, 443 S2d 834, 842-43 (Miss 1983) (equitable powers are broad and flexible). See also
Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potentialof Equity in Constitutional
Remedies, 33 Ariz L Rev 859, 859-60 (1991) ("In its method, which stresses flexibility and
the appropriateness of pragmatic solutions, equity is [ ] characterized by a relative lack of
concern for rules.").
" Levitt Homes Inc. v Old Farm Homeowners' Association, 111 Ill App 3d 300, 444
NE2d 194, 204 (1982). See also In re C.B., F.C., J.J., and L.K, 147 Vt 378, 518 A2d 366,
369 (1986); D.C. Trautman Co. v Fargo Excavating Co., Inc., 380 NW2d 644, 645-46 (ND
1986).
o The "irreparable injury rule" holds that when legal remedies are "inadequate" a
court is free to invoke its equitable powers. Although commentators doubt the consistency
and validity of this rule, its supporters and critics alike note that the showing necessary
to establish that a legal remedy is adequate is so difficult that equitable remedies are
almost always an option. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule,
103 Harv L Rev 687, 701-02 (1990); Gene R. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public
Interest, 51 Geo Wash L Rev 382, 402-03 (1983).
61 See, for example, Fisher v HealthInsurance Plan of GreaterNew York, 67 Misc 2d
674, 324 NYS2d 732, 737 (1971) (equity jurisdiction arises out of the court's inability to
adapt judgments to the particular circumstances of a case due to the inflexibility of legal
rules). The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine characterized equity in this way:
[Eiquity has always preserved the elements of flexibility and expansiveness so that
new remedies may be invented or old ones modified in order to meet the requirements of every case and to satisfy the needs of a progressive social condition. In
other words, the plastic remedies of equity are molded to the needs of justice and are
employed to protect the equities of all parties, and the flexibility of equitable jurisdiction permits innovation in remedies to meet all varieties of circumstances which may
arise in any case.
Levasseur v Dubuc, 229 A2d 201, 204 (Me 1967), citing 27 Am Jur 2d Equity § 103.
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presented in the education cases.
State courts have traditionally relied on the flexibility of
their equitable powers to safeguard individual rights. Courts are
particularly receptive to granting equitable remedies in civil
rights cases, where legal money damage remedies are often inadequate.62 In Butt v California, for example, the California Supreme Court employed its equitable powers to protect students'
education rights against the threat of an early school closure."
The court affirmed a decision that authorized the takeover of a
local school district by the state in order to remedy financial mismanagement that threatened to shorten the school year.' Similarly, state courts have fashioned equitable remedies to protect
housing65 and voting rights;' to secure adequate administrative hearings," integrated public facilities," and competent
mental 7care;69 and to guarantee the freedom of speech" and of
religion.

See Laycock, 103 Harv L Rev at 707-09 (cited in note 60) ("The principle that damages are an inadequate remedy for the loss of something irreplaceable is not limited to
unique or scarce tangible property. The principle also applies to intangible rights that
cannot be bought or sold in any market. This is why injunctions are the standard remedy
in civil rights and environmental litigation.") (footnotes omitted).
4 Cal 4th 668, 15 Cal Rptr 2d 480 (1992).
u Id at 497-500.
See Southern Burlington County NAACP v Township of Mount Laurel, 92 NJ 158,
456 A2d 390 (1983) (devising equitable remedies to protect constitutional due process
rights to low-income housing); Perez v Boston HousingAuthority, 379 Mass 703, 400 NE2d
1231 (1980) (using equitable powers to appoint a receiver for Boston Housing Authority).
' See O'Connors v Helfgott, 481 A2d 388, 394 (RI 1984) (ordering the redistribution
of voting powers on a local school committee in order to protect the "one-person, one-vote
principle"). See also Laycock, 103 Harv L Rev at 708 & n 102 (cited in note 60).
7 See Hein v Marts, 295 NW2d 167 (SD 1980) (ordering the denial of a water permit
that had been granted without an adequate hearing). See also Laycock, 103 Harv L Rev
at 708 & n 103 (cited in note 60).
' See Everett v Harron,380 Pa 123, 110 A2d 383 (1955) (upholding order that recreation area abandon its racially discriminatory admittance policies). See also Laycock, 103
Harv L Rev at 708 & n 104 (cited in note 60).
See O'Sullivan v Secretary ofHuman Services, 402 Mass 190, 521 NE2d 997 (1988)
(upholding order that hospital change its practices with respect to the seclusion and restraint of patients). See also Laycock, 103 Harv L Rev at 709 & n 117 (cited in note 60).
7' See Kenyon v City of Chicopee, 320 Mass 528, 70 NE2d 241 (1946) (holding that the
plaintiffs could obtain an injunction against the enforcement of a city ordinance that prohibited handbilling). See also Laycock, 103 Harv L Rev at 708 & n 106 (cited in note 60).
7'1 See Lily of the Valley Spiritual Church v Sims, 169 Ill App 3d 624, 523 NE2d 999
(1988) (ordering preliminary injunction to protect right to religious freedom). See also
Laycock, 103 Harv L Rev at 708 & n 107 (cited in note 60).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[62:795

B. Vouchers Are an Effective and Efficient Remedy
Vouchers provide a quick, effective, and narrowly tailored
remedy for violations of education rights. They enable courts to
remedy constitutional violations without becoming involved in
difficult policy decisions. While vouchers appear to be an innovative and aggressive solution, they are actually in many ways
the least intrusive alternative available to remedy the deprivation of education rights.
1. Vouchers provide a timely remedy.
Vouchers are first and foremost an effective remedy given
their timely impact. With vouchers, children transfer immediately from inadequate public schools to superior private schools. 2
As noted above, legislatures often wait decades before adequately
responding to unconstitutional school conditions, and courts have
proven equally unwilling to provide a solution.3 These delays
have potentially devastating effects on students' educational development. Education lawsuits filed when students enter kindergarten often remain unresolved by the time those students graduate from high school.74 Thirteen years of legislative inaction
results in thirteen years of ineffective education.
Because private school vouchers would transfer students into
quality schools immediately, they would afford these students an
opportunity to learn vital skills at the necessary time. Students
must learn certain skills at specific points in their development.
Second grade students in substandard public schools who fail to
adequately learn basic reading, writing, and arithmetic skills
develop into troubled third, fourth, and fifth graders. The problem compounds as students who lack the proper grounding in
basic skills progress through the system. When students are
forced to attend substandard public schools, their fate is in many
respects predetermined because "the kind of education [the stu-

' Catholic schools, for example, have continuously outperformed public schools
despite "low salaries, high faculty turnover and average teaching." See Peter Steinfels,
Why Catholic Schools Succeed: A Community of Shared Values, NY Times A32 (Apr 17,
1994). See also Note, State ConstitutionalRestraints on the Privatizationof Education, 72
BU L Rev 381, 386 (1992), citing a study published in James S. Coleman, Thomas Hoffer,
and Sally Kilgore, High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared 219-23 (Basic Books, 1982), which found that "private school students fared better
academically... than their peers who attended public schools."
See Section I.B.
4 See, for example, Lisa Davis, What Reform? Class of 2000 Unlikely to See Many
Changes, Phoenix Gazette A6 (Apr 22, 1994).
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dent] gets there shapes his future progress not only in school but
in society in general.""5
2. Precedent for a voucher remedy.
There is strong precedent for using vouchers in education
cases. In analogous situations involving mental hospitals,
prisons, and low-income housing, courts have instituted creative
equitable remedies, including vouchers, to correct constitutional
violations.7 6
For example, courts have demanded that handicapped students be educated at public expense in private schools of their
parents' choosing. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court in
Florence County School District Four v Carter unanimously affirmed a decision ordering a school district to reimburse the parents of a disabled child for the cost of educating their child in a
private school. 7 The Court upheld the plaintiffs' right to an education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 8
Under this federal statute, state officials are required to provide
a "free appropriate public education" for handicapped children, 9
and may send children to private schools at no cost to the
children's parents if local schools are unable to accommodate
them."° In Carter, the Court held that because the local school
district did not provide the student with the special services
required by her disability, her parents could enroll her in a private school and demand reimbursement.8 '
While the plaintiffs in Carter relied on a federal statute to
secure a voucher-like remedy, the language of the statute, guaranteeing a "free appropriate public education," mirrors that of
many state constitutional education clauses.8 2 Under the federal
statute, parents may seek judicial consideration of a student's
educational plan to determine if the curriculum provided is free

7' See Hobson v Hansen, 269 F Supp 401, 473 (D DC 1967).
'6 See Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in InstitutionalLitigation, 93 Harv L Rev 465, 489 (1980) ("It can scarcely be said
that a modem exercise of equitable power to correct conditions in a prison, hospital, or

school is a new-fangled addition to the judicial arsenal.").
114 S Ct 361, 361-63 (1993).
7 Id. See 20 USC §§ 1400 et seq (1988 & Supp 1990).
7' 20 USC § 1412(1). See also 20 USC § 1401(a)(18) (defining "free appropriate public
education").
' 20 USC § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i).
8' See 114 S Ct at 364-65.
"2 See text accompanying notes 10-11.
77
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and appropriate." Judges are given the power to place students
in private schools when public schools fail to provide the necessary level of education. In addition to statutorily authorized remedies, judges have similarly broad equitable powers when faced
with the violation of constitutional education rights.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carter is the latest in a
series of state and federal cases in which courts have vindicated
education rights with state funds in the form of voucher-like
remedies. The Supreme Court also approved the funding of a sign
language interpreter for a deaf student in Zobrest v Catalina
Foothills School District.' Courts have effectuated the rights of
blind,5 non-English-speaking," dyslexic, 7 and disabled students' as well. In each of these cases, a court recognized the
local schools' inability to provide a proper education and ordered
them to fund private school tuition. In each instance, these
voucher-like remedies presented the least intrusive remedy available to the court. Vouchers ensured the plaintiffs' rights without
involving the courts in prolonged debates on education policy.
State courts, like their federal counterparts, have also issued
voucher-like remedies to address the deprivation of education
rights. In Byrnes v Riles, a California court ordered the state to
reimburse the parents of a language-handicapped student after
they had placed him in a private school.8 9 Similarly, in Walker v
Cronin, an Illinois court allowed the mother of a handicapped
student to recover the cost of placing her child in a private
school."0 In these cases, as in the federal cases, the courts re-

20 USC § 1415(e).
113 S Ct 2462 (1993).
See Witters v Washington Departmentof Services for the Blind, 474 US 481 (1986)
(use of public education funds for a blind student at a Bible College is constitutionally
permissible).
' See Castaneda v Pickard, 648 F2d 989 (5th Cir 1981) (authorizing use of broad
remedial powers to secure the education rights of a Spanish-speaking student by, for
example, mandating greater teacher training and improved measures for monitoring
progress of students); United States v Texas, 506 F Supp 405 (E D Tex 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 680 F2d 356 (5th Cir 1982) (exercising remedial powers to correct school
discrimination against Mexican-American students by mandating a bilingual education
program).
' Straube v Florida Union Free School District, 801 F Supp 1164 (S D NY 1992)
(ordering the state to provide improved educational opportunities to a dyslexic student).
' School Committee of Burlington v Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471
US 359 (1985) (holding that municipality had to reimburse parents who moved disabled
child to private school after public school failed to provide adequate educational opportunities).
89 157 Cal App 3d 1170, 204 Cal Rptr 100, 105 (1984).
90 107 111 App 3d 1053, 438 NE2d 582, 586 (1982).
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solved education disputes, yet escaped difficult policy determinations by resorting to voucher-like remedies to effectuate education rights.
The courts' jurisprudence with regard to handicapped students is equally applicable to the plight of students who attend
substandard public schools in inner cities and elsewhere. While
vouchers issued to students in deficient schools would, due to the
number of students involved, place a significantly more serious
strain on education funds than vouchers issued to handicapped
students, the basis for relief would remain the same. Just as the
handicapped student is deprived of an adequate education because of insufficient facilities to accomodate his particular physical or learning disability, so too students at substandard schools
are deprived of their constitutional right to an adequate education because of ineffective public schools. Courts granting
voucher-like remedies to handicapped students would be equally
justified in granting other students vouchers that similarly ensure constitutionally mandated minimal educational opportunities.
3. Vouchers avoid intrusive judicial action.
Vouchers provide the best remedy to education disputes
because they effectively avoid judicial management of education
policy. By issuing vouchers, a court transfers students from constitutionally inadequate public schools to accredited private
schools that provide a constitutionally sufficient education. Because these private schools already provide satisfactory instruction, a court does not have to dictate the details of education
reform to protect the students' education rights.
Alternative solutions require significant judicial tinkering
with the present public school system. Judicially created institutional remedies are often criticized because they involve matters
beyond the expertise of the judiciary, requiring policy decisions
for which courts are poorly designed. 9' So far, at least one court
has tried unsuccessfully to second-guess school funding, facility,
and curriculum decisions.
Jenkins v Missouri9 2 highlights the difficulties with judicial-

See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
Harv L Rev 1281 (1976); Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District v
Rowley, 458 US 176, 208 (1982).
92 639 F Supp 19 (W D Mo 1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F2d 657 (8th Cir 1986).
While the Jenkins court faced desegregation issues, the court's involvement in the restruc-
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ly mandated education plans in which courts institute spending
and curriculum programs in an effort to improve educational
opportunities. In that case, the court devised a massive reorganization plan. Among its actions, the court enjoined a statutory tax
rollback, mandated staff hiring, supervised the planning and construction of new facilities, and collaborated in rewriting the curriculum. 93 However, despite the court's extensive efforts to improve educational opportunity and achievement, there has been
little progress in integrating schools, raising test scores, or lowering dropout rates."
In addition to school management, courts have previously
been involved in the takeover of prisons, mental hospitals, and
local government entities.9 5 This aggressive judicial action, however, often embroils courts in policy decisions traditionally reserved for the executive or legislative branches. Commentators
have criticized the courts' roles in these cases, questioning
whether courts have the authority or technical expertise to manage such institutions.'
Court-ordered vouchers would avoid intrusive judicial action
in state education systems. Vouchers do not replace school administrators with judges. Unlike alternative remedies, under
which courts take over schools or recommend legislative initiatives, vouchers do not require judicial decisions about per-pupil
funding, busing, student-to-teacher ratios, curriculum content, or
construction plans. Vouchers aim only to protect the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights; they avoid complex policy decisions and
reserve for the legislature questions of school accreditation and
standards. Clearly the "courts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete
aspects of a State's program of compulsory education."9 7

turing of the Missouri schools illustrates the problems involved in intrusive judicial
management of the education system.
93

Id at 26-46.

4 Despite efforts to create "the best school system money could buy" by infusing $1.3
billion in additional spending, the results in the Missouri public school system have been
dismal. See American Survey: The Cash Street Kids, Economist 23, 24-25 (Aug 28, 1993)
("So far, however, all this lavish expenditure has produced few of the desired results.").
' Robert F. Nagel, Separationof Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 Stan L Rev 661, 661-62 (1978) (citing Morgan v Sproat, 432 F Supp 1130 (S D
Miss 1977) (state prison); Wyatt v Stickney, 344 F Supp 373 (M D Ala 1972), aff'd in part,
Wyatt v Aderholt, 503 F2d 1305 (5th Cir 1974) (state mental health system); Bolden v City
of Mobile, 423 F Supp 384 (S D Ala 1976) (city government)).
' See generally Nagel, 30 Stan L Rev 661 (authority); Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev 1281
(expertise); Rowley, 458 US at 208.
17 Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 235 (1972). See also Rowley, 458 US at 208,
citing
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4. Possible school closings and other voucher objections.
Many school officials oppose private school vouchers, arguing
that vouchers will destroy public education by diverting both
students and funds out of public schools. These officials argue
that once a student is awarded a voucher, a precedent will be set
that allows all students in the "condemned" school to obtain
vouchers, thus destroying local public schools. Additionally, officials claim that vouchers undercut educational development by
siphoning off needed funding, further aggravating the already
difficult problems faced by public schools.". In essence, voucher
opponents argue that public funding for students must be kept in
the system if public schools are to survive. These objections do
not, however, justify the denial of students' affirmative constitutional rights.
a) Constitutionally guaranteed education rights. The
objections to vouchers are mitigated when weighed against the
individual students' constitutional rights to adequate educations.
Courts have recognized individual students' valid constitutional
claims to adequate educational opportunities. Fears that these
claims will alter the status quo in education do not justify the
denial of these rights. Many public schools have failed to meet
their duty, thus justifying judicial action to provide adequate
educational opportunities at alternative facilities. To deny voucher remedies because of the harmful effects such a solution might
have on the already deficient public schools ignores the states'
constitutional obligations. At the heart of the dispute is the
students' constitutional education rights, not the right of the
schools to exist.' Just as the courts dismantled unconstitutionally segregated schools, so too the courts must act to eliminate
unconstitutionally deficient schools.

Rodriguez, 411 US at 42 ("[C]ourts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult' questions of educational policy."); Milliken v
Bradley, 418 US 717, 742-43 (1974) (noting the logistical problems involved in large-scale
school busing, as well as the difficulties in financing and operating a new, judicially created school system).
'9 See Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against PrivateSchool Choice, 62 U Cin
L Rev 37, 39 (1993); Augustus F. Hawkins, Becoming Preeminent in Education:America's
Greatest Challenge, 14 Harv J L & Pub Policy 367, 382-83 (1991).
"
That a public school or schools should be closed for failing to properly educate its
students is not a new concept. Education reformers have long lobbied for alternative education systems. See John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, Education by Choice: The
Case for Family Control 23 (California, 1978) (describing radical changes proposed in the
1950s and 1960s).
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The issuance of vouchers to a group of student-plaintiffs in
one school does not ensure such a remedy for all students in that
school system. Under the proposed voucher plan, public schools
that provide good educational opportunities will continue to
thrive; it is only those schools that fail to provide adequate opportunities that will be affected by vouchers. Arguably, competition for students will make the good schools even better because
they will no longer have a guaranteed enrollment."°
Furthermore, school vouchers will not necessarily drain public school funds; in fact, school administrators might actually
have more money to spend on the students who remain. Vouchers could raise a public school's per-pupil funding because private
school tuition is often less costly than public school per-pupil
spending. In Chicago, for example, public schools receive approximately $5,600 per pupil, while private school tuition is as low as
$2,500.o1 Under a voucher system, the school district from

which a voucher participant withdraws would not lose the fund0 2 Consequently, public
ing that exceeds private school tuition."
school systems will not necessarily be drained of funds.
However, even if school closure is a possible result of voucher
remedies, the rationale for keeping the potentially affected
schools open is unclear given their inability to sustain minimal
levels of educational proficiency. Voucher opponents fight for the
institutional rights of schools; state constitutions, however, grant
education rights to individuals. Public schools exist to provide
students with their constitutionally guaranteed rights to education. To the extent that schools fail to do this, they serve no purpose." 3 Schools that infringe upon students' rights to education
rather than foster them should be closed. In short, the constitutional rights of the students trump the rights of schools.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that any voucher remedy is merely a temporary remedy to a much larger problem. Ideally, judicial activism will spark legislative reform. Thus,
" See Clint Bolick, Puerto Rico: Leading the Way in School Choice, Wall St J All
(Jan 14, 1994).
10 See Plaintiff's Appellate Brief at 4, Jenkins, No 92 CH 05578 (on file with U Chi L
Rev) (noting per-capita spending on public school students in Chicago); Voucher Plan Goes
to Court, Christian Sci Monitor 12 (Sept 14, 1992) (noting options available in private
schools for $2,500 per year).
10 See text accompanying note 6.
" Many public schools are considered to be failing. See Thomas G. Tancredo, The
Case For Vouchers, 71 Educ L Rptr 593, 593-94 (1992) (noting that despite consistent
signs of failure and poor results, public schools are perpetuated rather than shut down);
James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If, 35 BC L Rev 619, 626-27 (1994).
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if the issuance of vouchers to a significant portion of a school
population does indeed threaten school closure or even the complete breakdown of the public school system, the legislature always has the option to act, passing aggressive reform plans to
bring the state's school system in line with the necessary constitutional standards, and thereby foregoing the need for vouchers.
b) Policy concerns: Limited voucher remedy. In order to
address concerns that judicially imposed vouchers would result in
massive school closures, courts could alternatively grant vouchers
to only those plaintiffs who can meet certain limiting criteria.
While this alternative might fail to secure the constitutional
rights of every student, a limited voucher remedy would at least
improve the quality of education for students who opt out of the
public schools with vouchers. Under this more restrictive plan,
courts would only allow students in certain public schools to use
state per-pupil funding to attend constitutionally acceptable private schools. While such a limited voucher remedy undermines to
a certain degree the rights of the students excluded from the
voucher program, this system is nonetheless preferable to the
present system.
Vouchers could be limited in a variety of ways. For example,
in addition to establishing the unconstitutionality of their public
school, students might be required to show one or all of the following to qualify for a voucher: (1) that their families cannot
afford private school tuition; (2) that their current public school
fails to provide educational opportunities similar to those available at other schools in the district; and (3) that the private
school they wish to attend has space to accommodate them. Alternatively, vouchers might be strictly limited to, say, the bottom
5 percent of students, or the top 5 percent. Such a limited voucher remedy is not open ended, and would not likely threaten to
dismantle the public school system.
Courts could give specific content to these standards. The
showings for wealth and school standards, for example, might be
based on percentages or welfare cutoffs. Similarly, a court might
determine that only those students whose families are below the
poverty line and who attend schools ranked in the bottom 20
percent of the district are eligible for vouchers. Such a voucher
system does not decrease the effectiveness of the schools for those
students "left behind," but rather may incidentally improve the
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quality of education for those students who remain in public
schools.' 4
Another approach would be to distribute a limited number of
vouchers on a first-come, first-served basis. Such a limited remedy would adequately distribute resources to avoid the potentially
chaotic scenario in which an entire school system breaks down.
III. POLITICAL-QUESTION AND SEPARATION-OF-POWERS
OBJECTIONS TO VOUCHER REMEDIES
Voucher opponents often cite the separation-of-powers and
political-question doctrines as constraints on courts' power to issue vouchers. These doctrines, however, do not preclude judicial
action in the face of constitutional violations. Courts should grant
voucher remedies notwithstanding these doctrines; the voucher
remedy this Comment proposes is a nonintrusive remedy that
respects the separation-of-powers and political-question doctrines.
A. Doctrinal Objections
The two state courts that have considered requests for private school vouchers both concluded that the separation-of-powers and political-question doctrines precluded such a remedy.0 5
These doctrines, on which the courts in Jenkins and Arviso relied, reflect the judiciary's justifiable hestitation to enter areas
traditionally reserved to legislatures. However, these concerns
can be duly respected, as long as courts create limited remedies.
Courts have deferred to legislatures for years, and legislatures
have not responded. Therefore, courts should grant requests for
private school vouchers notwithstanding the separation-of-powers
and political-question doctrines.
These doctrines present related constraints on the ability of
courts to issue private school voucher remedies.0 6 The separation-of-powers principle arises when courts are active in an area
that is constitutionally reserved to another branch of government. The political-question doctrine similarly forbids courts to
make decisions in areas in which they lack competence either
"o'This claim does not rest on the proposition that those students left behind will definitively benefit, but rather that they may or may not benefit. The main point is that
those who receive vouchers will benefit, and that their benefit is better than no benefit at
all.
105 See Section I.C.
106 Justice Brennan once commented that "[tlhe nonjusticiability of a political question
is primarily a fumction of the separation of powers." Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 210 (1962).
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because there are no sufficiently clear standards or because they
lack substantive expertise. These objections are squarely presented when the judiciary attempts to remedy problems in public
schools.
The interpretation of the separation-of-powers and politicalquestion doctrines in state constitutional law often differs from
their interpretation in federal law." 7 Several state courts have
explicitly rejected a strict separation-of-powers doctrine."0 ' The
use of legislative vetoes and advisory opinions in many state
systems exemplifies these differences. While the Supreme Court
ruled that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional on separationof-powers grounds in INS v Chadha,0 9 state governments are
not precluded from employing them."0
Similarly, the political-question doctrine is less constraining
on courts at the state level. While commentators debate the scope

of the political-question doctrine's applicability in state courts, it
is clear that, at a minimum, the doctrine is less restrictive in
state courts than in federal courts."' Unlike federal courts,
state courts routinely handle cases allegedly outside their area of
competence, pursuant to their common law powers. While federal
courts are constrained by their limited jurisdiction, state courts
enjoy a grant of general jurisdiction. This broad scope of state

"o It is not uncommon for parallel language in the federal and state constitutions to
be read differently. Often it is the federal interpretation that moves the state courts to
adopt a variant interpretation. See G. Alan Tarr, UnderstandingState Constitutions, 65
Temple L Rev 1169, 1190-93 (1992).
" See, for example, State v Reed, 248 Kan 792, 811 P2d 1163, 1168 (1991) (holding
strict division of executive, legislative, and judicial branches is neither desirable nor
intended by the Kansas Constitution); Bartholomew v Schweizer, 217 Con 671, 587 A2d
1014, 1017-20 (1991) (holding a state statute that allowed counsel to propose suggested
damages in the closing argument did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine given
the natural overlap of powers); In re J.J., 142 I1 2d 1, 566 NE2d 1345, 1348 (1991),
quoting People v Reiner, 6 111 2d 337, 129 NE2d 159 (1955) (stating that a "doctrinaire"
interpretation of the constitutional provision regarding separation of powers is impossible
because of the difficulty in "classifying particular acts as exclusively legislative, executive,
or judicial"); Britton v Town of Chester, 134 NH 434, 595 A2d 492, 498 (1991) (noting the
overlap of powers and the inefficiency of a rigid separation-of-powers doctrine). See also
Robinson v Cahill, 69 NJ 133, 351 A2d 715, 737 (1975) ("Robinson IV") (Mountain and
Clifford dissenting), quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1.09 at
68 (West, 1st ed 1958) ("[Tihe true principle that should guide the allocation of power
within the general framework is not the principle of separation of the three kinds of
power but is the principle of check... The danger is not blended power. The danger is
unchecked power.").
109

462 US 919 (1983).

See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourseof State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich L
Rev 761, 809 & n 206 (1992).
. See id at 808-09.
"
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courts' jurisdiction allows them to develop the common law and,
in effect, invade the legislative sphere without violating the political-question doctrine."
Despite the more lax state standards, some state courts still
hold that the political-question and separation-of-powers doc-

trines bar judicial involvement in education policy.113 For instance, these courts maintain that education rights suits are
political questions because the power to decide education issues
is committed to the legislature, leaving no role for the judicial
branch in such matters." 4 They read the phrase "the legislature
shall," in the state education clause, to authorize exclusive domain in this field."1
Although state constitutions often grant legislatures the
power to make education decisions, they nonetheless impose a
duty on the state to provide some minimum, qualitative standard
of education, one that is ultimately subject to judicial review."'
The language in these provisions is imperative, not discretionary:
many of the clauses mandate that the legislature "shall" or
"must" create an appropriate education system. These education
clauses simultaneously impose a duty on the legislature and
grant a substantive education right to students. The Washington

1
Id. Justice Brennan set forth the federal standard for a political question in Baker
v Carr, 369 US 186. He stated that a political question exists if there is (1) a "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"; (2) a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3)
"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion"; (4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government"; (5)
"an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made"; or (6)
"the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id at 217.
1
See, for example, Danson v Casey, 484 Pa 415, 399 A2d 360, 366-67 (1979) (refraining from defining "thorough and efficient" education as used in the Pennsylvania Constitution, finding that the legislature was simply in a better position to handle education
issues).
114 See generally Note, 80 Ky L J at 317-21 (cited in note 29).
...See, for example, Kukor v Grover, 148 Wis 2d 469, 436 NW2d 568 (1989) (refusing
to act like a "super-legislature" and deferring to the state legislature regarding issues of
education). But see Tennessee Small School Systems, 851 SW2d at 148-52 (rejecting the
argument that the constitutionality of the school finance system was nonjusticiable).
16 Seventeen state constitutional education clauses mandate only that the legislature
establish a system of free public schools; twenty-two state constitutions require the legislature to provide some qualitative level of education (such as "adequate," "thorough," or
"efficient"); six state constitutions set a more demanding standard, calling, for instance,
for education to be promoted through "all suitable means"; and finally, four state constitutions make education an important or the most important duty of the state. See Thro, 79
Educ L Rptr at 23-25 & nn 24-39 (cited in note 1).
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Supreme Court noted the affirmative right created by that state's
education clause:
Flowing from this constitutionally imposed "duty" is... a
correspondent "right" .... Therefore, all children residing
within the borders of the State possess a "right," arising
from the constitutionally imposed "duty" of the State, to
have the State make ample provision for their education."'
Thus, the clause both imposes a duty on the legislature and creates a judicially enforceable right to education.
Although no constitutional provision expressly subjects constitutional powers to judicial review, judicial review of a state's
success in fulfilling its duties is necessary to preserve the notion
of checks and balances upon which state governments are structured. If a state legislature were insulated from any sort of judicial attack, the legislature would assume both legislative and
judicial powers: it would have the power to formulate policy,
make laws, and later pass on the constitutionality of its own
actions.
Education issues, while constitutionally committed to state
legislatures, are nonetheless subject to judicial scrutiny given the
state courts' role as the final interpreter of state constitutions." 8 Because state constitututional education clauses, like
other state statutes and constitutional provisions, are subject to
judicial interpretation, state judiciaries play an important role in
determining whether legislatures have fulfilled their constitutional duties. 9
Given their role as final arbiters of their states' constitutions,
state courts retain ample power to issue private school vouchers
-1 Seattle School District No. 1 of King County v Washington, 90 Wash 2d 476, 585
P2d 71, 91 (1978) (footnotes omitted). For example, the Washington Constitution declares
that the state legislature has a "paramount duty... to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders." Wash Const, Art IX, § 1.
"' See McDaniel v Thomas, 248 Ga 632, 285 SE2d 156, 157 (1981) ("Judicial review of
legislative enactments is central to our system of constitutional government and deeply
rooted in our history.") (citations omitted). See also Kirby, 777 SW2d at 394 (rejecting
contention that school funding issues present a political question not suitable for judicial review); Washakie County School DistrictNo. One v Herschler,606 P2d 310, 318 (Wyo 1980)
(holding that school finance case presented "no more a political question than any other challenge to the constitutionality of statutes"). See generally Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw U L Rev 1031 (1984-85).
" See Seattle School DistrictNo. 1, 585 P2d at 87 ("ITIhe judiciary has the ultimate
power and the duty to interpret, construe, and give meaning to words, sections, and
articles of the constitution. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.") (citations omitted).
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and thus check the unconstitutional actions of coequal branches
of government. 20 This power to check legislative action enables
courts to provide a remedy for the violation of a state constitutional right to education when other branches of government
have failed. 2 ' If the other branches have not satisfactorily responded to court decisions holding that public schools are constitutionally inadequate, the courts must intervene. Notwithstanding the political-question and separation-of-powers
doctrines, once courts have invited legislatures to act and they
have refused, courts should fashion narrowly tailored remedies to
protect constitutional rights. If courts do not act, they concede
that the state's constitution
"embodies rights in a vacuum, exist122
ing only on paper."
Some courts have also held educational challenges to be
nonjusticiable political questions because the abstract language
in the state constitutional education clauses, such as "adequate,"
"efficient," or "effective" education, lacks justiciable standards.23 However, as previously noted, state courts have fashioned justiciable standards to adjudicate education disputes by
reading specific requirements into the education clauses of state
constitutions. 124 Courts in New Jersey, West Virginia, Texas,
Kentucky, and Washington have overcome concerns of justiciable
standards by interpreting the constitutional language in terms of
concrete requirements.
Despite concerns about the political-question and separationof-powers doctrines, state courts have acted to protect education
rights throughout the country. There remains, however, the need
to fashion remedies for the violations of these rights. State courts
rejected these political-question and separation-of-powers argu-

120 See, for example, Robinson v Cahill, 69 NJ 449, 355 A2d 129, 139-40 (1976) ("Rob-

inson V") (Hughes concurring) (observing that state constitutions commit educational
matters to legislative and executive branches, and if these branches fail to fulfill such
duties in a constitutional manner, "the court too must accept its continuing constitutional
responsibility.., for overview ... of compliance with the constitutional imperative").
"' See Southern Burlington County NAACP v Township of Mount Laurel, 92 NJ 158,
456 A2d 390, 417-18 (1983) ("In the absence of adequate legislative and executive help, we
must give meaning to the constitutional doctrine in the cases before us through our own
devices, even if they are relatively less suitable.").
1
Robinson IV, 351 A2d at 720, quoting Cooper v Nutley Sun Printing Co., Inc., 36
NJ 189, 175 A2d 639, 643 (1961).
12 See, for example, Kirby v Edgewood Independent School District, 761 SW2d 859,
867 (Tex App 1988), rev'd, 777 SW2d 391 (Tex 1989); Danson v Casey, 382 A2d 1238, 1246
(Pa Commw Ct 1978), aff'd, 399 A2d 360 (Pa 1979). See also Pauley v Kelly, 255 SE2d
859, 898 (W Va 1979) (Neely dissenting).
'24 See text accompanying notes 25-26.
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ments when they held that school systems were constitutionally
inadequate in the first place. The remedial phase of these cases
should present no additional difficulties given that the courts
have already found the issue of education rights to be justiciable.
B. Judicial Activism in the Face of Legislative Inaction
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court and state
supreme courts have endorsed judicial activism in cases where
state officials are unresponsive to constitutional violations. In
Swann v Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education, a desegregation case, the United States Supreme Court held:
If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations.., judicial authority may be invoked. Once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. 5
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v Township of Mount
Laurel, 6 the New Jersey Supreme Court displayed a similar
inclination toward judicial activism, providing low-income housing opportunities in Mount Laurel despite legislative inaction.
The court said that it acted "first and foremost because the Constitution of our State requires protection of the interests involved
and because the Legislature has not protected them....
[E]nforcement of constitutional rights cannot await a supporting
political consensus .... That is our duty ....
[W]e do enforce the
Constitution." 7 Similarly, state courts have recognized violations of the state constitutional right to education, and they are
now under a similar obligation to fashion remedies.
Furthermore, the need for judicial activism is greater in
certain contexts. The Supreme Court has held that courts should
be particularly willing to take an activist role to protect the
rights of underrepresented groups.'
Courts need to be espe12 402 US 1, 15 (1970).
'* 92 NJ 158, 456 A2d 390 (1983).
127

Id at 417.

See United States v CaroleneProducts Co., 304 US 144, 152-53 n 4 (1938) (suggesting that the impediments to the political process's aim of properly representing minorities
may call for increased judicial activism); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review 84 (Harvard, 1980) (arguing that judicial review can guard
against malfunctions of the political process); J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme
Court in a Democratic Society-JudicialActivism or Restraint?, 54 Cornell L Rev 1, 9
1
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cially active when enforcing education rights because the victims
of such violations are often politically powerless. Typically, plaintiffs in education reform cases come from low-income backgrounds and have little political power. They usually cannot
amass the necessary resources to wage effective lobbying campaigns before their legislatures, and their interests will therefore
often be underrepresented in the political process.
C. Vouchers Are Less Offensive than Alternative Remedies
Private school vouchers are less offensive to the separationof-powers and political-question doctrines than the remedial
legislative orders that many courts now issue in suits brought
under state constitutional education provisions. In several states,
courts have mandated that legislatures fashion an appropriate
remedy and have provided rigid guidelines for doing so, despite
serious separation-of-powers and political-question concerns. In
Abbott v Burke,'29 for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
did not directly raise taxes or sponsor education legislation, but it
did become a silent participant in these legislative functions. The
court ordered the legislature to come up with an education plan
that provides educational equality 3 Such a plan is not feasible
without significant tax hikes and spending reallocation. These
acts are largely judicially created, despite being carried out by
the legislature. These acts present formidable separation-of-powers and political-question concerns, much greater than those
raised by private school vouchers. The acceptance of these legislative orders strongly suggests the validity of private school vouchers as well.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recently
condoned judicial involvement in state funding issues in Missouri
v Jenkins, when it upheld a federal court's imposition of state
taxes as a remedy for school segregation.'' The Court affirmed
lower court decisions that had instituted a remedial plan and
then raised taxes to finance it. Thus, courts are not absolutely
barred from adjudicating issues that directly affect the state treasury. In the face of constitutional violations, the court may be

(1968) ("If substantial rights are at stake which the legislative process cannot or will not
vindicate, the task of doing so unfortunately, but inevitably, passes to the courts.").
9 119 NJ 287, 575 A2d 359 (1990).
130 Id at 408-11.
131

495 US 33, 52-58 (1990).
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compelled to order the use of state funds to effectuate its orders.
State courts have in the past controlled state funds.3 2
CONCLUSION

Education in the United States remains troubled. While
teachers, administrators, and politicians debate the merits of
various education reform proposals, students endure overcrowded
classrooms, dilapidated buildings, and antiquated textbooks. The
national discussion over education has generated creative ideas:
teaching advances, computer technology, for-profit schools, and
more equitable taxation. Each of these proposals, however, requires time for both development and implementation. Unfortunately, students currently attending inadequate schools cannot
afford to wait years for reforms to take effect. State courts must
fashion remedies for violations of constitutional education rights
that are effective immediately. Private school vouchers provide
just such a means. Courts have recognized the fundamental right
to education under state constitutions for two decades; however,
enforcement of that right has been slow in coming. The prolonged
struggles between state courts and state legislatures over education reform have perpetuated substandard educational opportunities that violate students' constitutional rights. Narrowly
tailored vouchers, issued only to students in constitutionally
inadequate schools, provide an effective and timely solution.
Courts have the equitable powers to impose a voucher remedy;
they need to seriously consider this option, lest they forgo their
duties and fail to protect the education rights of students.

'

Robinson v Cahill, 69 NJ 133, 351 A2d 715, 721-22 (1975) ("Robinson IV").

